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How is poisoning a RAG system's datastore different fro...
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See plansIndirect prompt injection lives inside a single query’s context: an attacker plants an instruction in a document a user happens to bring into one conversation, and the attack ends when that conversation does. Datastore poisoning lives in the corpus itself: an attacker with any write path into ingestion — a public wiki your crawler indexes, a review platform, an open web crawl — inserts documents once, and every future query that happens to retrieve them inherits the attack, for every user, until the index is rebuilt. It’s a corpus problem, not a conversation problem, and the blast radius is amortized across every future request rather than confined to one.
The reason it’s so much cheaper than classical search-engine spam is structural: moving a global ranking signal like PageRank required something close to a genuine link farm, controlling a real fraction of the graph, because the ranking aggregates authority across the entire structure. Dense retrieval has no comparable global aggregate — a query’s top-k is a purely local nearest-neighbor computation, so an attacker doesn’t need to move the corpus’s center of mass at all, only win k slots for one specific question. PoisonedRAG demonstrates this concretely: crafting a handful of passages — as few as five — that simultaneously maximize similarity to a target question and embed a chosen false answer, injected into a corpus of millions, reaches attack success rates above 90%, independent of corpus size, because corpus size never enters the computation being exploited. Defenses built around counting documents or diversifying sources help against naive flooding but miss the harder version where an attacker registers several distinct-looking sources; the more robust fix caps trust per distinct actor rather than per document, and treats the retrieved set itself as adversarially contestable rather than trusting anything that made it into the index.